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Abstract. The nucleolus offers a desirable payoff-sharing solution in
cooperative games thanks to its attractive properties - it always exists
and lies in the core (if the core is non-empty), and is unique. Although
computing the nucleolus is very challenging, the Kohlberg criterion offers
a powerful method for verifying whether a solution is the nucleolus in
relatively small games (i.e., the number of players n ≤ 20). This, however,
becomes more challenging for larger games because of the need to form
and check the balancedness of possibly exponentially large collections
of coalitions, each collection could be of an exponentially large size. We
develop a simplifying set of the Kohlberg criteria that involves checking
the balancedness of at most (n − 1) sets of coalitions. We also provide
a method for reducing the size of these sets and a fast algorithm for
verifying the balancedness.
Keywords: Nucleolus; cooperative game; Kohlberg criterion.
1 Introduction
Cooperative games model situations where players can form coalitions to jointly
achieve some objective. Once such example is where entrepreneurs, with possi-
bly complementary skills, consider running a business together. Assuming that
the entrepreneurs can jointly run a more successful business than by working
individually (or in smaller groups), a natural question is how to divide the re-
ward among the players in such a way that could avoid any subgroup of players
to breaking away from the grand coalition in order to increase the total payoff.
Solution concepts in cooperative games provide the means to achieving this.
Formally, let n be the number of players and N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set
of all the players. A coalition S is a subset of the players; i.e., S ⊆ N . The
characteristic function v : 2N 7→ R maps each coalition to a real number with
v(S) representing the payoff that coalition S is guaranteed to receive if all players
in S collaborate, despite the actions of the other players. A solution (also called
a payoff distribution) of the game x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is a way to distribute the
reward among the players, with xi being the share for player i.
Given the total payoff v(N ) of the grand coalition, we are interested in effi-
cient solutions x which satisfy
∑
i∈N xi = v(N ). Let us denote x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi.
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For each imputation x, the excess value of a coalition S is defined as d(S,x) :=
v(S) − x(S) which can be regarded as the level of dissatisfaction the players in
coalition S feel over the proposed solution x. Here, we concern with profit games
and assume that it is more desirable to have higher shares. All the results can be
extended to cost games either through transforming the characteristic function
to the corresponding profit games or by redefining the excess values.
Player i is considered rational if he/she only accepts a share xi of at least
the amount v({i}). A group of players S is considered rational if it only accepts
a total share x(S) :=
∑
i∈S xi of at least the amount v(S) that the group is
guaranteed to receive by breaking away from the grand coalition and forming its
own coalition; i.e., d(S,x) ≤ 0.
An imputation is an efficient solution that satisfies individual rationality; that
is, xi ≥ v({i}), ∀i ∈ N . The core of the game is the set of all efficient solutions
x such that no coalition has the incentive to break away – i.e., satisfying group
rationality – and hence the solutions are stable. It is, however, possible that there
is no solution satisfying this set of conditions, and the core might not exist. In
that case, we consider alternative solutions that, although not stable, are least
susceptive to deviations. The first such solution concept is called the least core,
which minimizes the worst level of dissatisfaction among all the coalitions. Note
that the least core always exists but might not be unique. We denote I as the
imputation set and Co as the core of the game.
Among all solutions in the least core, if we also ensure not only the worst
dissatisfaction level but also all the dissatisfactions to be lexicographically min-
imized, we arrive at the concept of the nucleolus which is the ‘most stable’
solution in the imputation set. Formally, for any imputation x, let Θ(x) =
(Θ1(x), Θ2(x), . . . , Θ2n(x)) be the vector of all the 2
n excess values at x sorted
in a non-increasing order; i.e., Θi(x) ≥ Θi+1(x) for all 1 ≤ i < 2n. Let us denote
Θ(x) <L Θ(y) if there exists r ≤ 2n such that Θi(x) = Θi(y), ∀1 ≤ i < r and
Θr(x) < Θr(y). Then ν ∈ I is the nucleolus if Θ(ν) <L Θ(x), ∀x ∈ I, x 6= ν. If
we relax the condition x,ν ∈ I, we arrive at the definition of the prenucleolus.
The nucleolus is one of the most important solution concepts for cooperative
games with transferable utilities, and was introduced in 1969 by Schmeidler
[17] as a solution concept with attractive properties - it always exists (if the
imputation is non-empty), it is unique, and it lies in the core (if the core is non-
empty). Despite the desirable properties that the nucleolus has, its computation
is, however, very challenging because the process involves the lexicographical
minimization of 2n excess values, where n is the number of players. There are a
small number of games whose nucleoli can be computed in polynomial time (e.g.,
Solymosi and Raghavan [18], Hamers et al. [4], Solymosi et al. [20], Potters et al.
[13], Deng et al. [1], Kern and Paulusma [5]). It has been shown that finding
the nucleolus is NP-hard for many classes of games such as the utility games
with non-unit capacities (Deng et al. [1]) and the weighted voting games (Elkind
et al. [3]).
Kopelowitz [8] suggests using nested linear programming (LP) to compute
the kernel of a game. This encouraged a number of researchers to study the com-
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putation of the nucleolus using linear programming. For example, Kohlberg [7]
presents a single LP with O
(
2n!
)
constraints which later on is improved by Owen
[12] with O
(
4n
)
constraints (at the cost of having larger coefficients). Puerto and
Perea [15] recently introduces a different single LP formulation with O
(
4n
)
con-
straints and O
(
4n
)
decision variables and with coefficients in {−1, 0, 1}. The
nucleolus can also be found by solving a sequence of LPs. However, either the
number of LPs involved is exponentially large (Maschler et al. [9], Sankaran [16])
or the sizes of the LPs are exponential (Potters et al. [14], Derks and Kuipers
[2], Nguyen and Thomas [11]).
While finding the nucleolus is very difficult as shown in the aforementioned
literature, Kohlberg [6] provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a given
imputation to be the nucleolus as is described in the subsequent section. This
set of criteria is particularly useful in relatively small games (e.g., less than
10 players) or in larger games with special structures which allow us to take
an educated guess on the nucleolus. The verification of the criterion, however,
becomes time consuming when the number of players exceeds 15, and becomes
almost impossible in general cases when the number of players exceeds 25. This
is because the criterion requires forming the sets of coalitions of all 2n possible
coalitions and iteratively verifying if unions of these sets are balanced. This work
aims to resolve these issues and proposes a new set of simplifying criteria.
The key contributions of our work include the following:
– We present a new set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a solution to
be the nucleolus in Section 3.1. The number of subsets of coalitions to check
for balancedness is at most (n− 1) (instead of exponentially large).
– The balancedness condition is essentially equivalent to solving a linear pro-
gram with strict inequalities which are often undesirable in mathematical
programming. We provide a solution to this in Section 3.2.
– On checking the Kohlberg criterion, we might end up having to store an
exponentially large number of coalitions. We provide a method for reducing
this to the size of at most n(n− 1) in Section 3.3.
2 The Kohlberg criterion for verifying the nucleolus
For each efficient payoff distribution x, Kohlberg [6] first defines the following
sets of coalitions: T0(x) = {{i}, i = 1, . . . , n : xi = v({i})}, H0(x) = {N , ∅}
and Hk(x) = Hk−1(x) ∪ Tk(x), k = 1, 2, . . . , where for each k ≥ 1,
Tk(x) = argmax
S6∈Hk−1(x)
{v(S) − x(S)} , ǫk(x) = max
S6∈Hk−1(x)
{v(S) − x(S)} .
Here, Tk(x) includes all coalitions that have the same excess value ǫk(x)
and ǫ1(x) > ǫ2(x) > . . .. The terms ‘collection of coalitions’ and ‘subset of the
powerset 2N ’ are equivalent and used interchangeably in this paper. We also use
the terms ‘collection’ and ‘subset’ as their shorter versions.
For each collection Q ⊆ 2N , let us denote |Q| as the size of Q. We associate
each collection Q with a weight vector in R|Q| with each element denoting the
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weight of the corresponding coalition in Q. Throughout this paper, we use bold
fonts for vectors and normal font for scalars.
Let us denote e(S),S ∈ N , as a binary vector in Rn with the ith element
equal to one if and only if player i is in the coalition. With this, for all x ∈ Rn,
we have x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi = x
Te(S). The concept of balancedness is defined as
follows:
Definition 1 A collection of coalitions Q ⊆ 2N is balanced if there exists a
weight vector ω ∈ R
|Q|
>0 such that e(N ) =
∑
S∈Q ωSe(S).
Definition 2 Given a collection T0 ⊆ 2N , a collection Q ⊆ 2N is called T0-
balanced if there exist weight vectors γ ∈ R
|T0|
≥0 and ω ∈ R
|Q|
>0 such that e(N ) =∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T ωSe(S).
Remarks:
– Note that when T0 = ∅, the concept of T0-balanced is equivalent to the usual
balancedness concept.
– All results in this paper concern with finding the nucleolus. These results
and the algorithms can be simplified to finding the pre-nucleolus by setting
T0 = ∅.
For any collection Q of coalitions, let us define
Y (Q) = {y ∈ Rn : y(S) ≥ 0 ∀S ∈ Q, y(N) = 0} .
We have Y (Q) 6= ∅ since 0 ∈ Y (Q). The first key result in Kohlberg [6] that will
be exploited in this work is the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (Kohlberg [6]). Given a collection T0 ⊆ 2N , a collection T ⊆ 2N
is T0-balanced if and only if y ∈ Y (T0 ∪ T ) implies y(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ T .
This result allows the author to define two sets of equivalent properties on a
sequence of collections (Q0, Q1, . . .) as:
Definition 3 (Q0, Q1, . . .) has Property I if for all k ≥ 1, the following claim
holds: y ∈ Y (∪kj=0Qj) implies y(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ ∪
k
j=1Qj.
Definition 4 (Q0, Q1, . . .) has Property II if for all k ≥ 1, ∪
k
j=1Qj is Q0-
balanced.
The main result in Kohlberg [6] can be summarized in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (Kohlberg [6]). The following three claims are equivalent: (a) x
is the nucleolus; (b) (T0(x), T1(x), . . .) has Property I; and (c) (T0(x), T1(x), . . .)
has Property II.
Simplifying Kohlberg Criterion on the Nucleolus 5
Algorithm 1: Kohlberg Algorithm for verifying if a solution is the nucle-
olus of a cooperative game.
Input: Game G(N, v), imputation solution x;
Output: Conclude if x is the nucleolus;
1. Initialization: Set H0 = {eN , ∅}, T0 = {{i}, i = 1, . . . , n : xi = v({i})} and
k = 1;
while Hk−1 6= 2
N do
2. Set Tk = argmax
S6∈Hk−1
{v(S)− x(S)};
if (∪kj=1Tj) is T0-balanced then
3. Set Hk = Hk−1 ∪ Tk, k = k + 1 and continue
else
4. Stop the algorithm and conclude that x is not the nucleolus
end
end
5. Conclude that x is the nucleolus.
For completeness, we show a slightly different version and proof of Theorem 1
by Lemma 3 in Appendix A.
To appreciate the practicality of the Kohlberg criterion and for convenience
in the later development, we first present the algorithmic view of the Kohlberg
criterion in Algorithm 1.
In this algorithm, we iteratively form the tight sets Tj , j = 0, 1, . . . until either
all the coalitions are included and we conclude the input solution is the nucleolus
(i.e., stopping at step 5) or stop at a point where the union of the tight coalitions
is not T0-balanced (in step 4), in which case we conclude that the solution is not
the nucleolus. To demonstrate the Kohlberg criterion, we consider the following
simple three-player cooperative game:
Example 1 Let the characteristic function be: v({1}) = 1, v({2}) = 1, v({3}) =
1, v({1, 2}) = 7, v({1, 3}) = 4, v({2, 3}) = 5, v({1, 2, 3}) = 12. The set of all
imputations is: I = {(x1, x2, x3) : x1 + x2 + x3 = 12, x1 ≥ 1, x2 ≥ 1, x3 ≥ 1},
and the core of the game is:
Co = {(x1, x2, x3) : x1 + x2 + x3 = 12, x1 ≥ 1, x2 ≥ 1, x3 ≥ 1,
x1 + x2 ≥ 7, x1 + x3 ≥ 4, x2 + x3 ≥ 5}.
The least core is the line segment connecting x = (5, 4, 3) and y = (3, 6, 3).
The nucleolus is ν = (4, 5, 3). At the nucleolus ν, we can find T0 = ∅, T1 =
{{1, 2}}, {3}}, T2 = {{1}}, {2, 3}, {1, 3}}, ǫ1 = −2, ǫ2 = −3, and ǫ3 = −4. Here,
T1 is T0-balanced with a weight ω = (1, 1). Similarly, (T1 ∪ T2) is T0-balanced
with a weight ω = (1/2, 1/4, 1/4, 1/2, 1/4). We can also verify that the Kohlberg
criterion does not hold for any x′ 6= ν. For example, let x′ = 1/2(x+ ν). Then
T1 = {{1, 2}}, {3}} and T2 = {{2, 3}}. Although (T1) is T0-balanced, (T1 ∪ T2)
is not.
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3 The simplifying Kohlberg criterion
The Kohlberg criterion offers a powerful tool to assess whether a given payoff
distribution is the nucleolus by providing both the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions. This often arises in relatively small or well-structured games where a
potential candidate for the nucleolus can be easily identified and where checking
the balancedness of the corresponding tight sets can be done easily (possibly
analytically). For larger games, it is inconvenient to apply the Kohlberg crite-
rion because this could involve forming and checking for the balancedness of an
exponentially large number of subsets of tight coalitions, each of which could be
of exponentially large size. This section aims to resolve these issues.
3.1 Bounding the number of iterations to (n− 1)
On using linear algebra operators on the collection of coalitions, we slightly
abuse the notations and refer each coalition S ∈ 2N interchangeably with its
binary vector e(S) indicating whether the players are in the coalition. For each
collection of coalitions T , let us denote rank(T ) as the rank of the coalitions in
T and span(T ) as the collection of all coalitions that lie in the linear span of the
coalitions in T . The key idea in simplifying the Kohlberg criterion is to note that,
once we have obtained and verified the T0-balancedness of ∪kj=1Tj, we do not
have to be concerned about all those coalitions that belong to span(∪kj=1Tj). In
brief, this is because once a collection is T0-balanced, its span is also T0-balanced
as is formalized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2. From any collection T0 ⊆ 2
N , the following results hold:
(a) If a collection T is T0-balanced, then span(T ) is also T0-balanced.
(b) If collections U, V are T0-balanced then U ∪ V , span(U) ∪ span(V ) are also
T0-balanced.
(c) If U is T0-balanced and U ⊆ V , then span(U) ∩ V is also T0-balanced.
Proof. (a) Given that T is T0-balanced, there exists γ ∈ R
|T0|
≥0 and ω ∈ R
|T |
>0 such
that
e(N ) =
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S).
For any S0 ∈ span(T ), there exists β such that e(S0) =
∑
S∈T βSe(S). Thus,
for any δ, we have
e(N ) =
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S)
=
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S) + δ(e(S0)−
∑
S∈T
βSe(S))
= δe(S0) +
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
(ωS − δβS)e(S).
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Since α > 0, we can choose δ > 0 which is small enough such that (αS − δβS) >
0, ∀S ∈ T . Thus, T ∪ {S0} is a T0-balanced collection. Since this holds for all
S0 ∈ span(T ), we can conclude that span(T ) is T0-balanced.
(b) Given that collections U, V are T0-balanced, there exists γ,ω ∈ R
|T0|
≥0 and
α ∈ R
|U|
>0 , β ∈ R
|V |
>0 such that
e(N ) =
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈U
αSe(S) =
∑
S∈T0
ωSe(S) +
∑
S∈V
βSe(S).
This leads to
e(N ) =
∑
S∈T0
(1/2γS + 1/2ωS)e(S) +
∑
S∈U
1/2αSe(S) +
∑
S∈V
1/2βSe(S).
Thus U ∪ V is also T0-balanced. We can also prove that span(U) ∪ span(V ) is
T0-balanced in a similar way as shown in the proof of part (a).
(c) The proof is similar to part (a) due to the fact that, for any S0 ∈ span(U)∩
V , we have S0 ∈ span(U) and hence U∪S0 is also T0-balanced. Thus, span(U)∩V
is T0-balanced. 
With this result, we can provide an improved Kohlberg criterion as shown in
Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Simplified Kohlberg Algorithm for verifying if a solution is
the nucleolus of a cooperative game.
Input: Game G(N,v), imputation solution x;
Output: Conclude if x is the nucleolus or not;
1. Initialization: Set H0 = {eN , ∅}, T0 = {{i}, i = 1, . . . , n : xi = v({i})} and
k = 1;
while rank(Hk−1) < n do
2. Find Tk = argmax
S6∈span(Hk−1)
{v(S)− x(S)};
if (∪kj=1Tj) is T0-balanced then
3. Set Hk = Hk−1 ∪ Tk, k = k + 1 and continue;
else
4. Stop the algorithm and conclude that x is not the nucleolus.
end
end
5. Conclude that x is the nucleolus.
The main differences between Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 1 are: (a) the
stopping condition of the while loop has been changed from Hk−1 6= 2N to
rank(Hk−1) < n, and (b) the search space at step 2 has been changed from
S 6∈ Hk−1 to S 6∈ span(Hk−1). As a result, we have the following desirable
property:
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Theorem 2. The while-loop in Algorithm 2 terminates after at most (n − 1)
iterations and it correctly decides whether a solution is the nucleolus.
Proof. First of all, by construction in step 2 of the algorithm, Tk∪span(Hk−1) =
∅ and hence, by step 3, we have the rank of Hk = Hk−1 ∪ Tk keeps increasing.
Therefore,
n ≥ rank(Hk) = rank(Hk−1∪Tk) ≥ rank(Hk−1)+1 ≥ . . . ≥ rank(H0)+k = k+1,
and hence the algorithm, i.e., the while loop, terminates in at most (n − 1)
iterations. Here, we note that the algorithm terminates at either step 4 or step
5 with complementary conclusions.
Proving that the algorithm correctly decides whether a solution is the nucle-
olus is equivalent to showing that (a) if x is the nucleolus then the algorithm
correctly terminates at step 5, and (b) if the algorithm terminates at step 5,
then the input solution must be the nucleolus.
Part (a): If x is the nucleolus, then T1 must be T0-balanced as a direct result
from the Kohlberg criterion (described in Theorem 1). Thus T1 is T0-balanced
and the algorithm goes through to step 3 at k = 1. Suppose, as a contradiction,
that the algorithm goes through to step 4, instead of step 5, at some index k > 1;
that is (∪kj=1Tj) is not T0-balanced. By Lemma 1, there exists y ∈ R
n such that
y(S) ≥ 0,∀S ∈ ∪kj=0Tj ; y(N) = 0; y(S
′) > 0, for some S ′ ∈ ∪kj=1Tj . (1)
Notice, however, that ∪k−1j=1Tj is T0-balanced by the construction in step 3 of the
previous iteration. Therefore S ′ 6∈ Hk−1 since, otherwise, the result in Lemma 1
is violated. Thus S ′ ∈ Tk and hence (1) leads to
(x+ y)(S) ≥ x(S),∀S ∈ Tk; (x+ y)(S
′) > x(S ′), for some S ′ ∈ Tk,
⇒ d(S ,x+ y) ≤ d(S ,x),∀S ∈ Tk; d(S
′
,x+ y) < d(S ′,x), for some S ′ ∈ Tk,
that is, for all coalitions in Tk, the corresponding excess values for (x + y) is
no greater than that of x with at least one strict inequality for some coalition.
Thus,
Φ(x+ y) <L,Tk Φ(x), (2)
where, for each collection of coalition Q, the subscript (·L,Q) is the lexico-
graphical comparison with respect to only coalitions in Q. Since Hk−1 is T0-
balanced by the construction in step 3 of the previous iteration, span(Hk−1) is
also T0-balanced by Lemma 2. Thus, y(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ span(Hk−1) and
Φ(x+ y) =L,span(Hk−1) Φ(x). (3)
From (2) and (3) we have
Φ(x+ y) <L,span(Hk−1)∪Tk Φ(x). (4)
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For all S 6∈ (span(Hk−1) ∪ Tk) we have v(S)− x(S) < ǫk. Thus, there exists
δ > 0 and small enough such that
v(S)− (x+ δy)(S) < ǫk, ∀S 6∈ (span(Hk−1) ∪ Tk).
Note that results in (1) also holds if we scale y by any positive factor. Thus,
Φ(x+ δy) <L,span(Hk−1)∪Tk Φ(x).
In other words, the |span(Hk−1)∪Tk| largest excess value of x is lexicographically
larger than the excess values of (x + δy) on these collections of coalitions and
the remaining coalitions which means x is not the nucleolus. Contradiction!
Part (b): If the algorithm bypassed step 4 and went to step 5, then, (∪kj=1Tj)
is T0-balanced for all k until rank(Hk−1) = n. Let z be the nucleolus; then by
its definition, its worst excess value should be no larger than the worst excess
value of x, which is equal to ǫ1. Thus, the excess value of z over any coalition,
including those in T1, must be at most ǫ1; i.e.,
(z − x)(S) ≥ 0, ∀S ∈ T1.
Since T1 is T0-balanced, we have, by Lemma 1, (z−x)(S) = 0 for all S ∈ T1 (by
noticing also that (z − x)(N ) = 0 and (z − x)(S) ≥ 0, ∀S ∈ T0 from the fact
that z is an imputation and the construction of T0). Using a similar argument,
given that x and z are lexicographically equivalent on span(T1) and since z is
the nucleolus, we also have (z − x)(S) ≥ 0, ∀S ∈ T2. Thus,
(z − x)(S) ≥ 0, ∀S ∈ T1 ∪ T2.
Again, given that (T1∪T2) is T0-balanced, we have, by Lemma 1, (z−x)(S) = 0
for all S ∈ T1 ∪T2. We can continue with this and use an induction argument to
show that (z − x)(S) = 0 for all S ∈ Hk−1, k ≥ 1. Given that rank(Hk−1) = n,
we must have x = z or x is the nucleolus. 
Remark: It is noted that step 2 in both Algorithms 1 and 2 involves compar-
ing vectors of exponentially large sizes. Indeed we cannot escape from having
an exponentially large number of operations because we are (lexicographically)
comparing exponentially large vectors. The key finding in Theorem 2, however,
is to show that step 2 of Algorithm 2 is not repeated more than (n−1) times (in-
stead of possibly exponential times in the original Kohlberg criterion described
in Algorithm 1). Although we cannot escape from having exponential number of
operations for games without any structure, there are structured games such as
the voting game, the network flow game and the coalitional skill games in which
step 2 can be done efficiently. We refer the readers to Nguyen and Thomas [11]
for more details on this.
3.2 Fast algorithm for checking the balancedness
According to the Kohlberg criterion, to check the T0-balancedness of T , we need
to show the existence (or non-existence) of γ ∈ R
|T0|
≥0 and ω ∈ R
|T |
>0 such that
e(N ) =
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S).
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This is not a big issue for small-sized T where the inspection of such (γ, ω) can be
done easily. Solymosi and Sziklai [19] [Lemma 3] provide an approach by solving
|T | linear programs as follows. For each C ∈ T , let
q∗C =
{
maxwC :
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
wSe(S) = e(N ), (γ,ω) ∈ R
|T0|+|T |
≥0
}
.
Then T is T0-balanced if and only if q
∗
C > 0, ∀C ∈ T . Notice, however, that the
collection T appearing in the Kohlberg criterion could be exponentially large,
and hence solving all the |T | linear programs is not practical. We present a
faster approach that involves at most rank(T ) linear programs (this is an upper-
bound and, in practice, we often need to solve a much smaller number of LPs).
Algorithm 3 describes this in details.
Algorithm 3: Algorithm for checking the T0-balancedness
Input: A collection of coalitions T ;
Output: To conclude if T is T0-balanced or not;
1. Initialization: Set U = ∅;
while rank(U) < rank(T ) do
2. Solve
(γ∗,ω∗) = argmax
(γ,ω)∈R
|T0|+|T |
≥0
∑
S∈T\U
ωS s.t.
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S)+
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S) = e(N );
if ‖ω∗‖ = 0 then
3. Stop the algorithm and conclude that T is not T0-balanced;
else
4. Set U = span(U ∪ {S : ω∗S > 0}) ∩ T ;
end
end
5. Stop the algorithm and conclude that T is T0-balanced.
Theorem 3. Algorithm 3 correctly decides if T is T0-balanced and it terminates
in at most rank(T ) iterations.
Proof. First of all, the while loop should terminate given that rank(U) keeps
increasing via the construction of U in steps 2 and 4; i.e., the set U is kept added
with coalitions outside its span. Thus, the algorithm terminates at either step 3
or 5 and we need to prove that the corresponding conclusions are correct. If the
algorithm terminates at step 3, then ‖ω∗‖ = 0 (as otherwise the optimal solution
in step 2 should be strictly positive) and hence T is not T0-balanced. If the
algorithm terminates at step 5 then, prior to that, we have rank(U) = rank(T )
in order for the while loop to terminate. The construction of U in step 4 ensures
that U is a T0-balanced set by Lemmas 2b and 2c. Thus T = span(U) ∩ T is
also T0-balanced by Lemma 2c. In conclusion, the algorithm always terminates
with the correct conclusion. 
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3.3 Reducing the sizes of the tight sets
On checking the Kohlberg criterion, we might end up having to store an expo-
nentially large number of coalitions. We provide a method for reducing this to
the size of at most n(n− 1). We start with the following theoretical results.
Theorem 4. The following results hold
(a) If T ⊆ 2N is a T0-balanced set then there exists R ⊆ T with 1 ≤ |R| =
rank(R) ≤ rank(T ) that is T0-balanced.
(b) For nonempty P,Q ⊆ 2N with Q∪P is a T0-balanced set, there exists a subset
R ⊆ Q with 1 ≤ |R| = rank(R) ≤ rank(Q) such that R ∪ P is T0-balanced.
Proof.
(a) Given that T is T0-balanced, there exists γ ∈ R
|T0|
≥0 and ω ∈ R
|T |
>0 such that
e(N ) =
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S).
Thus,
0 6=
1∑
S∈T ωS
(
e(N )−
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S)
)
=
∑
S∈T
ωS∑
S∈T ωS
e(S),
i.e., 1∑
S∈T ωS
(
e(N ) −
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S)
)
belongs to the convex combination of
{e(S)}S∈T . Applying the Caratheodory theorem, there exists a subset U ⊆ T
with rank(U) = |U | = dim(T ) such that 1∑
S∈T ωS
(
e(N )−
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S)
)
=∑
S∈U βSe(S).
By removing those coefficients βS = 0, we obtain a subset R ⊆ U ⊆ T with
rank(R) ≤ rank(U) that is T0-balanced. Note also that, since
1∑
S∈T ωS
(
e(N )−
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S)
)
6= 0,
there exists at least a coalition S with βS > 0. Thus 1 ≤ rank(R) ≤ rank(T )
and R is T0-balanced. In addition, since rank(U) = |U |, we also have
rank(R) = |R|.
(b) Since Q ∪ P is T0-balanced, there exists γ ∈ R
|T0|
≥0 , α ∈ R
|P |
>0 and β ∈ R
|Q|
>0
such that e(N ) =
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈P αSe(S) +
∑
S∈Q βSe(S). Thus,
(e(N ) −
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S)−
∑
S∈P
αSe(S)) =
∑
S∈Q
βSe(S) 6= 0.
Using the same argument as in part (a), there exists a subset Q′ ⊆ Q with
rank(Q′) = |Q′| = dim(Q) such that
(e(N )−
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S)−
∑
S∈P
αSe(S)) =
∑
S∈Q′
βSe(S).
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By removing those coalitions S ∈ Q′ with βS = 0, we obtain a non-empty
subset R ⊆ Q′ such that R ∪ P is T0-balanced and 1 ≤ |R| = rank(R) ≤
rank(Q). 
We denote such a subset R in Theorem 3a as R = rep(T ;T0) and subset R
in Theorem 3b as R = rep(Q;P, T0). Algorithm 4 shows the improved Kohlberg
Algorithm for verifying if a solution is the nucleolus by replacing each tight set
of coalitions by its representation derived in Theorem 3.
Algorithm 4: Improved Kohlberg Algorithm for verifying if a solution is
the nucleolus of a cooperative game.
Input: Game G(N,v), imputation solution x;
Output: Conclude if x is the nucleolus or not;
1. Initialization: Set H0 = T0 = eN , T0 = {{i}, i = 1, . . . , n : xi = v({i})}, and
k = 1;
while rank(Hk−1) < n do
2. Find Tk = argmax
S6∈span(Hk)
v(S)− x(S);
if (Hk−1 ∪ Tk) is T0-balanced then
3. Set Rk = rep(Tk;Hk−1, T0), Hk = Hk−1 ∪Rk, k = k+1 and continue;
else
4. Stop the algorithm and conclude that x is not the nucleolus.
end
end
5. Conclude that x is the nucleolus.
The main difference between Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 2 is in step 3 where
we set Hk = Hk−1 ∪ rep(Tk;Hk−1, T0) instead of Hk = Hk−1 ∪ Tk. This means
we store only a representative of Tk in the subsequent rounds. The correctness
of the algorithm can still be proven as presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. The while-loop in Algorithm 4 terminates after at most (n − 1)
iterations and it correctly decides whether a solution is the nucleolus.
Proof. After each iteration, we have Rk 6⊆ span(Hk−1) and rank(Rk) ≥ 1 by
its construction. Therefore rank(Hk) = rank(Rk ∪Hk−1) keeps increasing and
hence Algorithm 4 terminates after at most (n− 1) iterations. We also note that
the algorithm terminates at either step 4 or 5 with complementary conclusions.
Proving that the algorithm correctly decides whether a solution is the nucle-
olus is equivalent to showing that (a) if x is the nucleolus then the Algorithm
terminates at step 5, and (b) if the algorithm terminates at step 5, then the input
solution must be the nucleolus. We use results from Lemma 2 and Theorem 3
for this.
The proof for part (a) is still the same as that proof for Theorem 2 since
the key property used in that proof was to keep Hk always T0-balanced. This
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is summarized as follows. If x is the nucleolus then T1 is T0-balanced and the
algorithm gets through to step 3 at k = 1. Suppose, on contradiction, that the
algorithm terminate at step 4 at some index k > 1 with (Hk−1 ∪ Tk) not T0-
balanced while Hk−1 is T0-balanced by the construction in step 3 of the previous
iteration. Then, by Lemma 1, there exists y ∈ Rn such that
y(S) ≥ 0, ∀S ∈ T0 ∪Hk−1 ∪ Tk; y(N) = 0; y(S
′) > 0, for some S ′ ∈ Tk.
Thus,
Φ(x+ y) <L,span(Hk−1)∪Tk Φ(x).
In addition, for all S 6∈ (span(Hk−1) ∪ Tk) we have v(S)− x(S) < ǫk by the
construction in step 2. Thus there exist δ > 0, which is small enough such that
v(S) − (x+ δy)(S) < ǫk, ∀S 6∈ (span(Hk−1) ∪ Tk)
and
Φ(x+ δy) <L,span(Hk−1)∪Tk Φ(x).
In other words, the |span(Hk−1)∪Tk| largest excess value of x is lexicographically
larger than the excess values of (x + δy) on these collections of coalitions and
the remaining coalitions which means x is not the nucleolus. Contradiction.
The proof for part (b) is also the same as that in Theorem 2 where the key
property of retaining the rank of Hk increased throughout the algorithm is still
preserved. Due to the T0-balancedness of (Hk−1 ∪ Tk), we can use Lemma 1
to recursively show that (z − x)(S) = 0 for all S ∈ Hk−1 ∪ Tk where z is the
nucleolus as follows.
Let y = z−x. We have y(N ) = 0 and y(S) ≥ 0, ∀S ∈ T0 due to the fact that
z is an imputation and the definition of T0. We also have y(S) ≥ 0, ∀S ∈ R1
due to the fact that Φ(z) ≤L,R1 Φ(x) (or otherwise z is not the nucleolus).
Applying result from Lemma 1 with a note that R1 is T0-balanced, we have
y(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ R1 which means z and x are lexicographically equivalent on R1.
We will prove by induction that y(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ ∪kj=1Rj for all indices k valid in
Algorithm 4. Suppose this indeed hold for (k − 1), i.e. y(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ ∪k−1j=1Rj .
In other words, z and x are lexicographically equivalent on ∪k−1j=1Rj which is the
collection of coalitions from which x receives the worst excess values. In order
for z to be at least as good lexicographically as x, the excess values of z on those
coalition in Rk must be no worst that those from x, i.e., y(S) ≥ 0, ∀S ∈ Rk.
Applying result from Lemma 1 with a note that ∪kj=1Rj is T0-balanced, we must
also have y(S) = 0, ∀S ∈ Rk.
Since rank(Hk−1) = n, we must have x = z or x is the nucleolus. 
Theorem 6. The collection of tight coalitions ∪kj=1Rj stored by Algorithm 4 is
of size at most n(n− 1).
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Proof. In the proof of Theorem 3, note that each Rj is constructed as a subset
of another full row rank subset, its size is at most n rows. Since the number of
iterations involved is at most (n−1), the total size of ∪kj=1Rj is at most n(n−1).

Remark : We conjecture that, under mild conditions, the size of ∪j = 1kRj is
equal to (n + k). We also conjecture that the algorithms developed can be ex-
tended to the case of finding the nucleolus within any polyhedron by replacing
the set T0 accordingly. We leave these explorations for future work though.
4 Conclusion
The Kohlberg criterion proves to be a powerful tool for verifying whether a payoff
distribution is the nucleolus in relatively small games. Its application to larger
games is, however, rather limited due to the need for repeatedly forming, storing
and checking the balancedness of an exponentially large collection of coalitions
for an exponentially large number of iterations. In this work, we simplify the
Kohlberg criterion to achieve the following desirable properties: (a) the number
of iteration is bounded to at most (n − 1), (b) the size of collections of coali-
tions for storage is at most n(n − 1). In addition, we provide a fast algorithm
for checking the balancedness. It is expected that the findings will boost the
applications of the Kohlberg criterion and possibly provide new directions for
finding efficient algorithms to compute the nucleolus.
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Appendix A: Alternative Proof of Kohlberg Criterion
Let (T0, T ) be two collections of coalitions. For each coalition C ∈ T , let us
introduce the following primal LP:
P (C) : max
γ,ω,α
ωC
s.t.
∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S)− αe(N) = 0,
γ ≥ 0, ω ≥ 0.
The corresponding dual problem is:
D(C) : min
y
0
s.t. yT e(S) ≥ 0, ∀S ∈ T0 ∪ T,
yT e(N ) = 0,
yT e(C) ≥ 1.
We have the following results:
Lemma 3. For any given pair of subsets (T0, T ) of the powerset 2
N , the follow-
ing are equivalent
(a) T is T0-balanced if any only if for all C ∈ T , the primal problem P (C) is
unbounded.
(b) For any C ∈ T , the primal problem P (C) is unbounded if any only if the
dual D(C) is infeasible.
(c) The primal problem D(C) is infeasible for all C ∈ T if any only if (T0, T )
has property II.
(d) (T0, T ) has property II if and only if T is T0-balanced.
Proof. Result in part (d) is what we want to show and this will follows directly
if we are able to show (a)-(c). We choose to show both sides of the if and only
if statements in part (a)-(c) so that each of these can be viewed as stand-alone
results eventhough the proof of the entire lemma only requires one direction such
as (a)⇒(b)⇒(c)⇒(d)⇒(a).
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(a) ⇒ If T is T0-balanced, there exists weight vectors γ ∈ R
|T0|
≥0 ,ω ∈ R
|T |
>0 such
that ∑
S∈T0
γSe(S) +
∑
S∈T
ωSe(S) = e(N).
For each C ∈ T , we have (γ,ω, 1) is a feasible solution to P (C) with an
objective value of ωC > 0. Since the problem is homogeneous on (γ,ω, α),
that is for all ∆ > 0, we have (∆γ, ∆ω, ∆α) is also a feasible solution with
an optimal value of ∆ωC . Thus, the primal problem is unbounded and hence
the dual problem P (C) is infeasible.
⇐ For each C ∈ T , given the primal problem P (C) is unbounded, we can
pick a corresponding feasible solution (γ,ω, 1) with a positive objective value
ωC . Average out all such feasible solutions (γ,ω, 1), one for each C ∈ T , we
would obtain the average weight (γ¯, ω¯) that satisfies γ¯ ≥ 0, ω¯ > 0, and∑
S∈T0
γ¯Se(S) +
∑
S∈T
ω¯Se(S) = e(N)
Thus, T is T0-balanced.
(b) We can see that the primal problem is alway feasible at (γ = 0,ω = 0, α = 0).
In addition, the problem is homogeneous on (γ,ω, α) and hence its optimal
value is either zero or positive infinitive (unbounded). The dual problem, on
the other hand, is either infeasible or with an optima value of zero. From
linear programming duality results, it is easy to show that in this case, the
primal is unbounded if and only if the dual is infeasible.
(c) ⇐ If (T0, T ) has property II, we have D(C) infeasible for all C ∈ T by
definition of property II.
⇒ If D(C) infeasible for all C ∈ T then (T0, T ) must have property II since
otherwise there exists a y ∈ Y (T0 ∪ T ) and a coalition C ∈ T such that
y(C) > 0. Thus, we can scale up y by an appropriate factor ∆ such that
∆y ∈ Y (T0 ∪ T ) and ∆y(C) ≥ 1. This means the dual problem D(C) is
feasible. Contradiction!

